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Abstract. Fingerprint recognition systems are widely deployed in various real-
life applications as they have achieved high accuracy. The widely used applica-
tions include border control, automated teller machine (ATM), and attendance
monitoring systems. However, these critical systems are prone to spoofing at-
tacks (a.k.a presentation attacks (PA)). PA for fingerprint can be performed by
presenting gummy fingers made from different materials such as silicone, gela-
tine, play-doh, ecoflex, 2D printed paper, 3D printed material, or latex. Biometrics
Researchers have developed Presentation Attack Detection (PAD) methods as a
countermeasure to PA. PAD is usually done by training a machine learning clas-
sifier for known attacks for a given dataset, and they achieve high accuracy in this
task. However, generalizing to unknown attacks is an essential problem from ap-
plicability to real-world systems, mainly because attacks cannot be exhaustively
listed in advance. In this survey paper, we present a comprehensive survey on ex-
isting PAD algorithms for fingerprint recognition systems, specifically from the
standpoint of detecting unknown PAD. We categorize PAD algorithms, point out
their advantages/disadvantages, and future directions for this area.
Keywords: Presentation attack detection · Anomaly detection · Biometrics · In-
formation Security, · Anti-spoofing · Fingerprint · Spoofing Material
1 Introduction
Biometrics based authentication systems provide more security than traditional infor-
mation security-based systems based on passwords/Personal Identification Number (PINs),
and keys/cards [10]. The primary limitations with traditional information security meth-
ods are that they lack good user experience, using the same security measure with multi-
ple applications, and forgetting/losing the password/PINs [6]. Especially for keys/cards,
they can be duplicated apart from the previously mentioned limitations. Since biomet-
ric systems are based on human characteristics such as the face, fingerprint, or iris,
which are unique for every individual, they have a definite advantage over informa-
tion security-based systems. Due to these advantages, biometric systems are widely
deployed in smartphones, border control (both in automated, and attended scenarios),
and national identity cards. However, biometric systems are vulnerable to Presentation
Attacks (PA) [26], due to which some crimes have been reported in the media, where
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Fig. 1: Different attacks on the fingerprint recognition systems shown as pho-
tographs [21], and as fingerprints [29]).
the biometric systems were spoofed [49,46,30]. An attacker can perform the attack on
the biometric system by presenting a biometric artefact or a Presentation Attack Instru-
ments (PAIs) [35]. PA can be performed in different biometric modalities, including the
face, fingerprint, and iris. Since fingerprint recognition systems are widely deployed in
critical security systems, it is essential to develop fingerprint PAD.
PAIs for fingerprint can either be an artificial object such as a gummy finger (made
from play-doh, silicone, or gelatine) or a 2D/3D printed photo. In terms of implementa-
tion, PAD systems can be either a hardware-based or a software-based, whose main task
is to distinguish between a real (bona fide) user or a malicious (imposter) attacker [1].
A summary of existing fingerprint PAD methods can be found in Marcel et al. [25],
Marasco et al. [23], Galbally et al. [13], and Sousedik et al. [41]. In the current sce-
nario, the majority of the existing PAD methods consist of training a classifier to ac-
curately model the characteristics of the PAI. However, such an approach suffers from
the problem of generalization to detect unknown attacks [25]. Thus, developing a reli-
able PAD technique for unknown attacks is a significant problem that can also be posed
as anomaly (outlier) detection. Fingerprint recognition systems have been widely de-
ployed, as mentioned earlier, and are prone to PA. Since the attacks cannot be listed in
advance, detecting unknown attacks for the fingerprint is critical. Our survey on finger-
print Presentation Attack Detection (FPAD) presents the following:
– Comprehensive survey of existing methods for FPAD for unknown attacks.
– Categorization of existing methods for the FPAD of unknown attacks.
– Discussion on advantages/disadvantages of existing methods for FPAD, especially
for unknown attacks.
– Concluding remarks with future directions for the area of FPAD.
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In the rest of the paper, a comparison between traditional PAD done in a supervised
manner, and anomaly detection based FPAD in Section 2, which is followed by Sec-
tion 3 summarizing related work in FPAD which includes their categorization, advan-
tages, and disadvantages in terms of generalization, and finally we present conclusions
& future directions for FPAD in Section 4.
2 Traditional PAD & Anomaly Detection based PAD
Fingerprint Presentation 
Attack Detection
Same Sensor
Sensor 
Characteristics 
Multi-spectral 
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Convolutional 
Neural Network
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Detection
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Fig. 2: Illustration of taxonomy for fingerprint presentation attack detection.
In this section, we present a comparison between traditional PAD (a form of su-
pervised classification) and anomaly detection (supervised/unsupervised classification)
based PAD, as shown in Figure 2. Since we are interested in unknown attack detection
for fingerprint, this can be achieved by Anomaly detection [3]. We now briefly review
Anomaly detection in the following subsection:
2.1 Anomaly Detection
Anomaly Detection refers to the determination of irregularity in a dataset. The dataset
contains a set of records (aka., instances, objects, or entities), where each record in-
cludes a set of attributes (aka., characteristics or features), as pointed out by Chandola
et al. [3]. In general, an anomaly detection method is provided with a record/set of
records as an input, where no information about either anomalies or regular classes is
known to the detection method in advance [27]. The three modes of anomaly detection
methods, according to Chandola et al. [3] are as follows:
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Traditional PAD Anomaly detection based PAD
Characteristics - Information about PAI is gathered
and known in advance.
- Establish profiles of normality
features which are extracted from
regular data.
- Look for PAIs’ features each time
a presentation occurs.
- Compares the normality features
of each new presentation against
the established profiles.
- Alerts for PA if any PAI is found
to be in the new presentation.
- Alerts for PA if a deviation from
normality is detected in the new
presentation based on threshold.
Advantages - Possibility to detect known PAs. - Possibility to detect known and
unknown PAs.
- There is a possibility of using
existing knowledge to recognize
new forms of old PAs.
- Does not care about the used PAI
during the attack.
Drawbacks - For each novel PA, PAD methods
should be updated and tested with
the new PAI.
- Hard to define a profile of normal-
ity features for each bona fide pre-
sentation.
- As the number of PAs increases,
and correspondingly PAIs in-
crease, the complexity of PAD in-
creases.
- Higher false-positive for PAs de-
pending on accessibility or usabil-
ity.
- Hard to detect previously unseen
PAs.
- Hard to set the optimal threshold
value for PAD.
- Simple changes to PAI in a known
PA can be enough to miss the de-
tection of the PA.
- The size of normality feature can
be very large, which leads to a
high false-positive rate.
- A leak of PAIs’ list that a system
maintains could help attackers by-
pass the system’s PAD method.
Table 1: Characteristics, advantages and disadvantages of Anomaly detection based
PAD as compared to Traditional PAD for biometrics.
– Supervised anomaly detection:
Anomaly methods that are based on a predictive model which is trained by a labeled
dataset of two classes (i.e., normal and anomaly records). Any unseen record is
then compared against the model to determine whether it is a normal or an anomaly
record. This can be achieved by using publicly labeled fingerprint datasets for train-
ing. This form of anomaly detection is used in traditional PAD and in unknown
attack detection where the sensor is known in advance for FPAD.
– Semi-supervised anomaly detection:
Anomaly methods that are based on a single classifier trained using only normal
behavior records from a dataset, as only those are labeled. This form of anomaly
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detection is used for unknown attack detection both for the known sensor, & un-
known sensor for FPAD.
– Unsupervised anomaly detection:
Anomaly methods do not require training data, but no records are labeled in the
dataset if training is applied. This method is based on the assumption that regular
records are far more frequent than anomalies in both training and testing datasets,
and can lead to high false reject rate if this assumption is violated. This form of
anomaly detection is used for unknown attack detection for the known sensor, and
the unknown sensor for FPAD.
Table 1 shows a description of traditional and anomaly detection based PAD. Theoret-
ically, the main advantage of anomaly-based PAD methods over traditional methods is
capturing both the known and the unknown PAs. In contrast, the traditional PAD meth-
ods can detect known PAs, and maybe new forms of these attacks. For instance, if a
traditional PAD method is trained only to detect gummy fingers of play-doh, it may
not detect gummy fingers of other materials like silicone or gelatine. This requires the
traditional PAD methods to make a long list of PAIs gathered from known PAs, and the
methods should be updated and re-trained each time a new unknown PA is revealed.
Consequently, the list of PAIs and known PAs can become long and hard to maintain.
Moreover, if an attacker gets access to the list of PAIs used to train a biometric system,
the attacker will be able to conduct a PA using a novel PAI that is not known to the
systems.
Even if anomaly PAD methods solve several drawbacks in traditional PAD methods,
they come with high risks, implementation difficulties, and critical disadvantages. In
general, it is difficult to define and extract all features of bona fide presentations (i.e.,
normality features), because these features can have a broad scope and thus become
hard to use for an implementation of a PAD method. Moreover, the threshold used
to distinguish between PAs and bona fide presentations is affected with accessibility
or usability issues between the subject, and the capture device, which makes it hard
to define. Thus, the size of the normality features will be large, and it may require
prioritizing some features over others during the feature selection. Nevertheless, size
reduction methods can be used to reduce the number of features normality. However,
this will lead to more false-positive alarms as the normality features are not precise
enough to distinguish between all the cases of PAs and bona fide presentations.
3 Known & Unknown Presentation Attack Detection for
fingerprints
We now review the related work for FPAD in general, and specifically for unknown at-
tack detection of fingerprints. Many software and hardware PAD methods are presented
in the literature to detect PAs against fingerprint recognition systems. PAs can be con-
ducted using PAIs in two fingerprint forms (e.g., overlays), and additionally using 3d
printed fingers [41]. Software approaches make use of features extracted by standard
sensing technologies, which can further be divided into static (e.g., sweat pores and
texture of ridges and valleys) and dynamic features (e.g., skin color change over time
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Ref. S/H/W Dataset Pre-processing Post-processing # unknown PAs A. D. methods A. D. mode
[24] S LivDet 2009 - - 1 - S
[37] S LivDet 2011 GLCM, HOG, BSIF - 2 SVM, S
LPQ, LBP, BGP Rule-based
[38] S LivDet 2011 LBP Score fusion 4 SVM S
[36] S LivDet 2011 BSIF, LBP, LPQ - 3 SVM S
[34] S LivDet 2011, Image segmentation - 4 CNN S
LivDet 2013, (part of CNN)
LivDet 2015
[48] S & H Own dataset ROI segmentation - 6 Pre-trained CNN S
[15] S & H Own dataset ROI segmentation Score fusion 3 SVM S
[14] S & H Own dataset ROI segmentation Score fusion 5 SVM, S
CNN,
Pre-trained CNN
[47] S & H Own dataset, ROI segmentation, Score fusion 5 SVM, S
LivDet 2017 RGB image creation CNN,
Pre-trained CNNs
[4] S MSU-FPAD, Minutiae detection, Score fusion 6 Pre-trained CNN S
PBSKD Patches creation,
Patches alignment
[40] S LivDet 2011, Dense-SIFT Score fusion 8 ≤ SVM, S, U
LivDet 2013, K-means,
LivDet 2015, PCA
LivDet 2019
[5], W MSU-FPAD v2, Patches extraction Score fusion 3 Pre-trained CNN S
[12] LivDet 2015
LiveDet 2017
Table 2: Overview of Fingerprint PAD using anomaly detection for unknown
PAs. (where the abbreviations used are Anomaly Detection (A. D.), Soft-
ware/Hardware/Wrapper (S/H/W), Supervised (S), Semi-Supervised (SS), and Unsu-
pervised (U))
due to pressure). Software approaches are usually cheaper to implement (as no extra
hardware is needed), and less intrusive to the user [13]. Hardware approaches introduce
a new device to the sensing technology to capture more details than standard sensors
(e.g., fingerprint sweat, blood pressure, or odor). Keeping in mind that hardware solu-
tions are only used to capture data, and they usually have associated software solutions
with them that distinguish between bona fide and PAs, which can either be inbuilt in the
sensor or as stand-alone software. So, in theory, if two different hardware approaches
as in [14] and [19] use Short Wave Infrared (SWIR) and Laser Speckle Contrast Imag-
ing (LSCI) techniques respectively, they can still process each other datasets using the
same software in their approaches. According to Galbally et al. [13] hardware-based
approach introduces a higher fake detection rate than a software-based approach. This
survey paper considers the type of approach (i.e., hardware and software) as a compar-
ison factor, as shown in Table 2.
3.1 Pre-processing techniques (Software-based)
We now briefly review the pre-processing techniques in the literature attached to the
PAD methods presented in Table 2. These can be texture-based descriptors such as
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Local Binary Pattern (LBP) [32], Grey Level Co-occurrence Matrix (GLCM) [17], His-
togram of Oriented Gradients (HOG) [7], Binary Statistical Image Features (BSIF) [37],
Local Phase Quantization [33], Binary Gabor Patterns (BGP) [50], Dense-SIFT [40]
or techniques such as Image Segmentation, Region of Interest (ROI) Segmentation or
Finger-print Minutae detection.
3.2 Convolutional Neural Network (Software-based)
We now briefly review the deep learning-based approaches; Park et al. [34] presented a
supervised software-based approach using a convolution neural network (CNN), which
did not use the PAD of unknown PAs. However, they tested the approach on the LivDet
2015 data sets that contains four unknown PAs [29]. The CNN network devised by them
takes the full image of a fingerprint. It outputs a three-dimensional tensor that is used
to determine the probability of the image being a bona fide or an attack presentation.
The liveness probability is compared to an optimal threshold obtained from the training
phase, where they achieved an average classification error of 1.5% for the unknown
PAs. The usage of deep learning approaches has become a trend in the last decade,
which is mainly due to the freely available pre-trained networks such as VGG [39],
GoogleNet [42], and ResNet [18]. Tolosana et al. [47] published a new experiment,
where a PAD method relies on the use of SWIR and RGB images. Deep features from
RGB images are extracted via two pre-trained CNNs, namely VGG19 and MobileNet,
and a ResNet network trained from scratch. The features output by the CNNs is feed to
an SVM. Additionally, handcrafted features as spectral signatures were extracted from
SWIR images. For the final evaluation, a score fusion applied, and the reported D-EER
for this experiment was 1.36%.
3.3 Known Sensor & Known Attacks
Marasco et al. [23] provided an overview of PAD methods in the literature for finger-
print recognition systems, and they specifically point out that commercial fingerprint
recognition systems can be spoofed. Most of these approaches test their performance
on a test dataset with the same PAs as used during the training. Thus, these PAs are con-
sidered known to the PAD-method, which is a less realistic scenario than a real-world
environment setup where additional PAIs may be used to conduct PAs (i.e., unknown
attacks).
3.4 Known Sensor & Unknown Attacks
To the best of our knowledge, Tan et al. [44] were the first to point to the effect of en-
vironmental conditions and new PAI materials on PAD methods for fingerprints. They
showed that new PAI to increases the error rate by at least 14% and up to 55,6 % on
different fingerprint scanners as Identix, Crossmatch, and Digital Persona. Moreover,
their experiment showed that the error rate drops back into an acceptable range once
new PAIs are used in the training phase. This was later confirmed by Marasco et al.
in [24], in which they experimented the increase of spoof detection error rates of five
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fingerprint liveness detection methods (given by Marasco et al. [22], Moon et al. [28],
Shankar et al. [31], Abhyankar et al. [2], and Tan et al. [45]) when tested on the new
PAIs that were not used during training. Marasco et al. [24] used the leave-one-out
approach in their experiment, where only one PAI out of gelatine, play-doh, and sili-
cone is used for testing, and the other two are used for training as they train the PAD
methods using both PAs and bona fide presentations and can be classified as supervised
anomaly detection approach. To solve the problem of unknown PAIs, Rattani et al. [37]
proposed a scheme for automatic detection and adoption of the liveness detector to new
PAIs. Their liveness detection is a combination of a multiclass-SVM and rule-based
approaches that form an AdaBoost-based classifiers[11]. The Adaboost classifiers are
used to detect novel PAs, and new PAIs used in each attack, followed by a binary clas-
sification SVM that corresponds to live and spoof classes, where the thresholds are
maintained by multi-class SVM. In a case where a novel PA is presented to the detec-
tor, two rules apply to determine whether the PA is novel or already known. The first
rule computes the maximum posterior probabilities for each known PA and bona fide.
So, PA is considered novel if it overcomes a defined threshold else it is regarded as a
known PAs and belongs to the corresponding class value. The second rule estimates the
standard deviation of the posterior probabilities computed in the first rule. A low stan-
dard deviation value indicates doubt in classifying the PA as a known. Additionally, they
state the possibility of their PAD method to update the maintained binary classification
SVM automatically, thus that it is always considered learned to known PA materials.
This method is considered supervised because two out of four materials in the LiveDet
2011 dataset were used for training (i.e., two known PAIs and two unknown PAIs). The
published results mentioned up to 46% improvements in detecting unknown PAIs. Rat-
tani et al. [38] published a study where they tried to reduce the material-specific noise
and apply a software-based method that learns the general artifacts in images from PAIs
that correspond to different materials. This is done by using two SVMs that combine
linear filtering and non-linear denoising using wavelet decomposition of PAIs on an
LBP-based textural-analysis liveness detector. Their experimental results gained up to
44% improvements in detecting unknown PAs on LiveDet 2011 dataset. The training
phase during the experiment is done using one material out of five. Thus, the method
is tested on four unknown attacks. Rattani et al. [37] used Weibull-calibrated SVM (W-
SVM) can be used both for the detection of liveness and spoofs, and discovery of new
novel PAs and PAIs. Also, they claim W-SVM that supports interoperability between
individual detectors. The results show 44% improvements in detecting novel materials
on Livedet 2011 dataset. Tolosona et al. [48] used a VGG pre-trained network as a PAD
method in the finger recognition system. They use ShortWave Infrared Imaging (SWIR)
images since the skin reflection within the SWIR spectrum of 9001700 nm is indepen-
dent of the skin tone as analyzed by the National Institute of Standards Technology
(NIST). Thus, they used a hardware sensor approach to capture SWIR images of bona
fide and PAs (i.e., own dataset), and a software-based approach for PAD. A total number
of six unknown PAIs were detected by their PAD method, giving high convenience and
secure, supervised PAD method. The same hardware developed by [48] is capable of
capturing finger vein images (i.e., Visible Light Images, VIS) and speckle contrast im-
ages (LSCI) in addition to SWIR images. Gomez-Barrero et al. [15] proposed a multi-
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modal finger PAD method where they use different ad-hoc approaches in parallel for
each image type, and several SVM classifications are set to output a score of each ad-
hoc approach where the final score is given by the weighted sum of all individual scores
obtained. The evaluation in this approach is applied to both known and unknown PAIs
(in total 35, three are unknown), resulting in a Detection Equal Error Rate (D-EER) of
2.7%. Gomez-Barrero et al. proposed another multi-modal approach [14], in which the
proposed PAD method relies on a weighted sum of two CNN networks based on SWIR
images and textural and gradient information from averaged LSCI images. They applied
a pre-trained VGG19 network and a ResNet network that was trained from scratch for
the CNNs. The textural and gradient information extracted from averaged LSCI images
is passed into three SVMs for classification. They used the dataset from [15], increas-
ing the number of unknown attacks to five PAIs, and reporting a decrease in the D-EER
from 2.7% to 0.5%. Chugh et al. [4] proposed a software-based FPAD method with a
generalization against PAIs not seen during training. They studied the characteristics
of twelve different PAIs and bona fide presentations using deep features extracted by a
pre-trained CNN, namely, MobileNetv1. Further, they applied an agglomerative clus-
tering based on the shared characteristics of PAIs. Thus, they concluded that a subset
of PAIs, namely silicone, 2D paper, play-doh, gelatine, latex body paint, and monster
liquid latex, are essential PAIs to include during the training to achieve a robust PAD.
An android smartphone application is presented without a significant drop in perfor-
mance from the original PAD method. They achieved a True Detection Rate (TDR) of
95.7% and False Detection Rate (FDR) of 0.2 % when the generalization set is used for
training (i.e., the six PAIs).
3.5 UnKnown Sensor & Unknown Attacks
Rattani et al. [36] declared the need for fingerprint PAs detection to be considered as
an open set recognition problem. Thus, incomplete knowledge about neither PAs nor
PAIs is known to the PAD method during training. Therefore, they adopted W-SVM,
which uses recent advances in extreme value theory statistics for machine learning to
directly address the risk of the anomalies in an open set recognition problem. Ding et
al. [8] proposed the use of an ensemble of One-Class Support Vector Machines (OC-
SVM) using bona fide samples to generate a hypersphere boundary which is refined by
a small number of spoof samples, for classification of unknown PAIs. Jain et al. [9] de-
veloped a one-class classifier that is based on training on learning of bona fide samples
using multiple GANs (Generative-Adversarial Networks) which can reject any PAI.
Gonza´lez-Soler et al. [40] proposed a software-based PAD method and achieved an
overall accuracy by 96.17% on the LivDet2019 competition. This method relied on
three image representation approaches, which combine both local and global informa-
tion of the fingerprint, namely Bag-of-words (BoW) [16], Fisher Vector (FV) [43], and
Vector Locally Aggregated Descriptors (VLAD) [20]. They computed Dense-SIFT de-
scriptors at different scales, and the features are then encoded using a previously learned
visual vocabulary using the previously mentioned image representation approaches. A
linear SVM classifier is applied to classify the fingerprint descriptor in each method.
A weighted sum computes the final decision score. BoW approach uses K-means clus-
tering local features and presents it as a pyramid of spatial histograms. FV approach is
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based on statistical and spectral-based techniques, where the Gaussian Mixture Model
(GMM) locates local features that lie under the same distribution. Then, these features
are presented in a lower dimension via Principal Component Analysis (PCA). VLAD
approach, on the other hand, relied on non-probabilistic techniques and is used to re-
duce the high-dimension image representation in BoW and FV. They experimented with
both scenarios of their PAD method, namely supervised (i.e., known PAs) and unsuper-
vised (i.e., unknown PAs) scenarios. Chugh et al. [5] and Gajawada et al. [12] present
a wrapper that can be adopted by any fingerprint PAD method to improve the general-
ization performance of the PAD method against unknown PAIs. These approaches are
based on synthesizing fingerprint images that correspond to unknown PAs and bona fide
images as well. The goal is to transfer the characteristics into a deep feature space so
that a more precise presentation helps the PAD method increase its generalization per-
formance. The method is based on multiple pre-trained VGG19 CNNs that encode and
decode the content and style loss of the synthesized images, as they can be further used
to train the PAD method. They use the same PAD software method as done by Chugh et
al. [4] to experiment with the wrapper. Moreover, this approach is a supervised method
in which they use the leave-one-out technique on each PAI for MSU-FPADv2, where
the other PAIs are known in training. On the other hand, in LivDet 2017 dataset, three
PAIs were considered unknown.
4 Conclusions & Future Directions
This survey paper presented unknown attack detection for fingerprints, including a sur-
vey of existing methods summarized & categorized in Table 2, additionally a taxonomy
of FPAD is presented in Figure 2. Currently, most unknown attack detection methods
for fingerprints are solving the problem of known sensors and unknown PAIs, and there
are only a few methods which are unknown sensor, and unknown PAI, including cross-
dataset.
Unknown attack detection with unknown sensors is a relatively new area of research
for FPAD and should be the focus area in near-future. The first approach to solving it
is of synthesis, as done by Jain et al. [9]. The second approach is to arrive at a common
deep-feature representation, such as the one used by Gonza´lez-Soler et al. [40]. The
challenge in synthesis based approach is to do high-quality synthesis of the bona fide
samples, and the difficulty in arriving at a common deep-feature representation is the
degree of invariance it can provide to sensor type and PAI.
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